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Chapter 7
Arnošt Kolman’s Critique of Mathematical 
Fetishism
Jakub Mácha and Jan Zouhar
…is a huge, blindingly transparent tank taking the form of a kind of endlessly complex 
polyhedron, located somewhere beyond space and time. It is a tank filled with pure 
thought, symbols and without any form of judgment and devoid of any content. It is a 
tank into which their worshipers plunge their eternally reproducing logical constructions 
and mathematical schemes of the world. … Such is logicism. … This is the escape of 
philosophers into absolute logical truth, an escape not only from material existence but 
also from spiritual experiences as well, into a world which is said to be elevated over both 
subjectivity and objectivity. … But neither does the suicidal fetishization of perishing, 
which the existentialists worship, nor the fetishization of ‘pure science’, which the ‘logi-
cal positivists’ pray to (and which actually means the death of science), have any firm 
ground beneath them.1
When Arnošt Kolman uttered these impassioned words at the Tenth International 
Congress of Philosophy in Amsterdam in 1948, he drew a strong condemnation 
from Bertrand Russell. Their exchange ended up in personal attacks.2 In this paper, 
we would like to look at Kolman’s arguments against logical atomism which revolve 
around the notion of the fetishization of mathematics.
1 Arnošt Kolman, “Úkoly soudobé filosofie”, in: Tvorba, Vol. 17, No. 33, 1948, p. 647. English trans-
lation: Arnošt Kolman, “Tasks of Contemporary Philosophy”, in: Russell: the Journal of Bertrand 
Russell Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2016. The congress is covered in Russell’s Collected Papers, Volume 
11: Last Philosophical Testament 1943–68, ed. by John G. Slater, London and New York: Routledge, 
1997, pp. 115–116. All other translations from Czech and Russian are ours.
2 For details of this exchange see Jakub Mácha, “Arnošt Kolman and Bertrand Russell at the 1948 
International Congress of Philosophy”, in: Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, Vol. 
36, No.2, 2017, pp. 128–138.
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7.1  Commodity Fetishism in Marx
Kolman derives his notion of fetishism from Marx’s conception of commodity 
fetishism, or from capital fetishism as expounded in Marx’s Capital.3 What Kolman 
is aiming for is not the nature of the relations between individuals and their praxis 
in commodity production. Here he is aiming for the fact that an entity (system, 
structure, logical construction) acquires besides its real existence another formal 
existence. It is this doubling of its existence and then the becoming of an indepen-
dent driving force that is developing independently of, but at the same time deter-
mining the character of the field of its activity. Fetishes belong to human existence. 
No nations, no individual can do without them. They appear in public life as a part 
of ideologies in a new form, as a bearable guise of real and unwanted truth, however 
they should not have any place in science.
7.2  Application of the Concept of Fetishism on Mathematics
According to Marx, commodity fetishism occurs if the exchange value of a com-
modity (i.e. its exchange form) appears to have no connection with the use value of 
the commodity (i.e. its natural form). The commodity-form which is detached from 
the physical nature of the commodity has a phantasmagoric appearance. Fetishism 
means this fantastic detachment of the physical characteristics of real things or phe-
nomena from these things.4 The distinctive feature of a mathematical fetishism is 
that the detached characteristics are quantitative properties.5 Kolman speaks mostly 
of mathematical fetishism, less often of logical fetishism. We will return to this 
distinction in the contexts of Kolman’s critique of reducing mathematics to logic 
and logic to mathematics. It is noteworthy that these quantitative properties do not 
need to necessary be illusory or erroneous. The formal or abstract concepts, which 
we use to express these properties, acquire a standalone existence. In the second 
step (on a higher level) of this development, mathematical or logical categories are 
proclaimed to be the only true reality. Mathematical principles are proclaimed to be 
3 Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977. The 
passage on commodity fetishism is Section 4 “The fetishism of commodities and the secret of 
thereof”.
4 Arnošt Kolman, Kritický výklad symbolické metody moderní logiky [The Critical Exposition of 
the Symbolic Method of Modern Logic]. Praha: Orbis, 1948, p. 280.
5 Kolman had already written in 1931 that the roots of mathematical fetishism go back to Hegel. 
Kolman appreciated that “by coming out against the fetishisation of quantity, which after all is only 
a reflection of the abstract money-trading relations of the bourgeois order, Hegel in this case actu-
ally burst apart the framework of bourgeois philosophy.” (Ernst Kolman, Sofya Yanovskaya, 
“Гегель и математика” [“Hegel and Mathematics”], Под знаменем марксизма [Under the 
Banner of Marxism], No. 11–12, 1931, pp.  107–120. English translation in: Mathematical 
Manuscripts of Karl Marx. London: New Park Publications, 1983, pp. 235–255, p. 242.)
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the principles of all being.6 Mathematical concepts and principles, therefore, can 
undergo change independently of the things from which they have been abstracted. 
There is no reluctance to the formation of new, more and more complex mathemati-
cal structures which allegedly then disclose the deepest metaphysical truths about 
all being.
Mathematical fetishism is according to Kolman something that is typical of our 
way of thinking which “has an inert inclination towards turning this relative side of 
knowledge into an absolute one.”7 However, more important here are the social 
conditions that lead to fetishism. In order to investigate them closer let us turn now 
to ancient societies where these relations were much more transparent than they 
are today.
7.3  Pythagorean Fetishism
Kolman discovers the roots of contemporary mathematical fetishism to be in 
Ancient Greece in the form of the Pythagorean teachings. The core of Pythagorean 
fetishism is the taking of mathematical relations or ratios for the origins (ἀρχή) of 
all being. Kolman quotes the following passage from Aristotle:
…the so-called Pythagoreans applied themselves to mathematics, and were the first to 
develop this science; and through studying it they came to believe that its principles are the 
principles of everything. And since numbers are by nature first among these principles, and 
they fancied that they could detect in numbers, to a greater extent than in fire and earth and 
water, many analogues of what is and comes into being—such and such a property of num-
ber being justice, and such and such soul or mind, another opportunity, and similarly, more 
or less, with all the rest—and since they saw further that the properties and ratios of the 
musical scales are based on numbers, and since it seemed clear that all other things have 
their whole nature modelled upon numbers, and that numbers are the ultimate things in the 
whole physical universe, they assumed the elements of numbers to be the elements of 
everything, and the whole universe to be a proportion or number.8
For explaining the origin of Pythagoreanism, some additional social circum-
stances are needed. These circumstances remained covert to Aristotle. In 
Pythagoreanism, the abstract is detached from the concrete and the reason for this 
detachment is to disguise the real nature of things for the majority of ancient society. 
The abstract realm is portrayed here as less easy to understand.
The true root of fetishism is commodity production.9 The numerical form of 
things is fetishized into the form of number, in order to better enable the monetary 
exchange of goods. Together with this absolutization of numbers, monetary  relations 
6 Ibid., p. 251.
7 Ibid., p. 19.
8 Aristotle, Metaphysics. Trans. A. Armstrong. London: Heinemann 1933, I.5, 985b–986a.
9 Arnošt Kolman, “O podstatě a původu pythagoreismu” [On the Nature and Origin of 
Pythagoreanism], in: Česká mysl, No. 40, 1947, p. 148.
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are rendered to be absolute as well. We can perceive here in an embryonic form that 
things start to acquire properties that are not contained in them. They are at the same 
time objective properties still, because one could indeed exchange the commodity 
at this value. Aristotle asks in vain: Why do the properties of mathematical objects 
occur in perceivable things, if they are not contained in them?10 The explanation of 
metaphysical theories lies in the social base and “the objectively existing commod-
ity fetishism of human relations finds its reflection also in an ideological 
superstructure”.11 Pythagorean fetishism and their numeral mysticism, thus has a 
socio-political rather than naturalistic origin.12
Pythagoreanism is a typical example of the metaphysical way of thinking, char-
acterized by Kolman as the transposing of that which is created by our thinking onto 
the world, nature and society.13 Laws of thought, i.e. logical laws, are not found in 
nature nor derived from praxis; they are given to us a priori and independently of 
any praxis. They are only applied on nature and social praxis. To acknowledge the 
praxis as the sole criterion of truth means to accept the material character of reality. 
Anything else is idealism. With this delimitation in mind we can now turn to logical 
positivism.
7.4  Logical Positivism
Already by 1931 in the journal Under the Banner of Marxism in the article “Hegel 
and Mathematics”,14 Kolman had positively assessed the merits that Hegel enjoyed 
in this area of mathematics. Hegel refused the a priori formalist approach to math-
ematical axioms and theorems. Kolman wrote critically about the “logicists” 
(Russell, Frege), who in his opinion had overturned mathematics into a grammar, 
into a colossal tautology, which was then unable to bring any new knowledge to the 
subject of its investigation. This one-sided approach to reality could not compre-
hend the desired connection with the practice of mathematics. According to Kolman, 
the role of mathematics in science is limited—unlike that of Kant’s approach where 
science requires or better presupposes mathematics. Mathematical concepts do not 
express any absolutely unchanging, eternal truths; they are connected with society 
itself, alongside with the other (natural or social) sciences.
10 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII.9, 1085a–b.
11 Arnošt Kolman, “O podstatě a původu pythagoreismu”, op. cit., p. 149.
12 Max Weber also thought that Pythagoreanism had a socio-political origin. But for him, this 
movement does not express or mirror the ideology of a ruling class, but rather “emerge[s] when the 
ruling strata, noble or middle class, have lost their political power to a bureaucratic-militaristic 
unitary state.” (Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Trans. and 
ed. G. Roth, C. Wittich et al. Berkeley: University of California Press 1978, Vol. 1, p. 503.)
13 Arnošt Kolman, Logika [Logic]. Praha: Svoboda 1947, p. 161.
14 Ernst Kolman, Sofya Yanovskaya, “Гегель и математика” [“Hegel and Mathematics”], Под 
знаменем марксизма [Under the Banner of Marxism], No. 11–12, 1931, pp. 107–120.
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In his main work, The Critical Exposition of the Symbolic Method of Modern 
Logic (1948), Kolman knuckles down to a sharp critique of the tenets of analytic 
philosophy of that time, i.e. logical empiricism and neo-positivism. The core of this 
critique is already present in his critique of Pythagoreanism: “They are ancient, long 
time refuted thoughts that are go back to Platonism, Pythagoreanism.”15 Kolman 
uses the expressions “logical positivism”, “modern positivism”, “logical atomism” 
almost interchangeably as different labels for a more or less unified philosophical 
movement. He finds the main features of this movement to be: (1) neutral monism 
(reality is neither material, nor ideal), (2) the task of philosophy is the description of 
phenomena, not their explanation, (3) diminishing or refuting the significance of 
philosophy.16 If the task of philosophy is only the describing of positive facts or 
showing that anything that goes beyond them is nonsensical, “then it is natural that 
the method of the most universal science—mathematics—becomes the universal 
method of knowledge”.17 According to Kolman—and this is the core of his argu-
ment—the fetishization of mathematics follows then from the limited role of phi-
losophy. If philosophy were deprived of every critical and explanatory task, then 
only a logical analysis of language would remain. The principles of such an analysis 
must (logically, not temporally) precede every statement itself. Logical laws must 
be a priori. The independence of the logical laws of facts means that they can be 
applied to all facts, i.e. to the whole world which is the totality of facts.18 Logical 
laws are thus the principles of all being.19
7.5  Logic and Mathematics
Kolman, being a mathematician in the first place, speaks mainly about mathematical 
fetishism and less often about logical fetishism.20 He also criticized the attempts of 
reducing mathematics to logic (logicism) and vice versa. Mathematics and logic 
have according to Kolman different tasks. Logic “studies arbitrary forms indepen-
dently of their content”.21 The task of logic is a clarification of the (logical) structure 
15 Arnošt Kolman, Kritický výklad symbolické metody moderní logiky, op. cit., p. 7.
16 Ibid., p. 276.
17 Ibid., p. 277.
18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. by D. Pears and B. McGuinness. 
London: Routledge 1961, §1.1.
19 This argument can be applied to any a priori law or structure. See in this context the chapter “The 
Criticism of Kantianism from the Left and From the Right” from Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-
criticism. (Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism: Critical Comments on a 
Reactionary Philosophy. Lenin Collected Works. Vol.14. Trans. A. Fineberg. Moscow: Progress 
Publishers 1972.)
20 Arnošt Kolman, Kritický výklad symbolické metody moderní logiky, op. cit., pp. 212 & 219.
21 Ibid., p. 18.
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of sciences, including mathematics,22 while mathematics studies only the quantita-
tive forms and relations. In order to clarify the logical structure of science, simple 
logical systems are enough. These systems can be modeled mathematically (classi-
cal logic can be taken as Boolean algebra). Mathematics is on the one hand a part of 
logic (because it studies quantitative forms only), its combinational possibilities on 
the other hand far exceed the possibilities of classical logic.
Kolman ascribes this attempt of reducing mathematics to logic to Frege and 
Russell23 and the opposite attempt of reducing logic to mathematics to the Vienna 
Circle,24 but also to Russell and Wittgenstein.25 Kolman is inaccurate here and his 
arguments are abridged. In the end, it is not decisive whether the most fundamental 
abstraction is mathematical or logical. As we have seen above, from one perspec-
tive, mathematics is a part of logic; from another perspective it is the other way 
around. It is nevertheless a formal abstraction and Kolman criticizes their arbitrary 
detachment from the content and their fetishization. Ultimately: “Formal logic as 
well as mathematics … divides what is actually connected, and connects what in 
fact is divided.”26
7.6  Critical Assessment of Kolman’s Reception of Logical 
Positivism
Do Russell, Wittgenstein and members of the Vienna Circle commit fetishization of 
mathematics or logic?
Bertrand Russell was a leading proponent of neutral monism in the twentieth 
century. After years of sympathizing with this doctrine he fully subscribed to it in 
his book The Analysis of Mind: “both mind and matter are composed of a neutral- 
stuff which, in isolation, is neither mental nor material.”27 In Russell, we find also 
Kolman’s second and third characteristic of logical positivism. The task of philoso-
phy is the logical analysis of positive facts, not their explanation: “The business of 
philosophy … is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis”28; 
or: “The most important part … consists in criticizing and clarifying notions”.29 The 
significance of philosophy is reduced to the anticipation of the yet unknown. The 
22 Ibid., p. 220.
23 Ibid., pp. 199 & 203.
24 Ibid., p. 205.
25 Ibid., pp. 253–4.
26 Ibid., p. 230.
27 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind. London: George Allen & Unwin 1921, p. 25.
28 Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. London: Routledge 2010, p. 147.
29 Ibid.
J. Mácha and J. Zouhar
141
difference between philosophy and science is only in that philosophy is concerned 
with what we do not know, while science with what we already know.30 In this sci-
entific image, Russell did not hesitate to accept that there are general principles that 
cannot be derived from experience.
In Wittgenstein’s Tractatus there are plenty of assertions that meet Kolman’s 
characteristics. Wittgenstein clearly meets the second and third characteristic of 
logical positivism: (2) Philosophy is the logical analysis of (scientific) lan-
guage31 and (3) very little is achieved by solving (all) philosophical problems.32 
For the first characteristic—neutral monism—there is no unambiguous confir-
mation to be found in the Tractatus. Objects make up the substance of the world. 
But Wittgenstein leaves open whether these objects are dependent on the think-
ing subject. Kolman (without any backing argument) inclines to the so-called 
epistemological interpretation, which is close to Russell and was later revived 
by Hintikka33: Objects are sensory perceptions, i.e. sensory data.34 Apart from 
this interpretation, both realistic and idealistic interpretations of objects have 
appeared. Wittgenstein was reluctant to decide as to the character of the basic 
building blocks of the world. Therefore, we can also—albeit indirectly—attri-
bute neutral monism to him. The absolutization and fetishization of logic should 
therefore result from these three characteristics. And indeed, such claims are to 
be found in the Tractatus. Logical tautologies describe the basic structure of the 
world. Wittgenstein speaks directly about the scaffolding of the world “Gerüst 
der Welt”.35
Rudolf Carnap in his book The Logical Structure of the World (Der Logische 
Aufbau der Welt)36 explicitly endorses Mach’s neutral monism. The basic building 
blocks of his Aufbau are called “elementary experiences”, which Carnap later called 
“basic elements” and likened to Mach’s elements, i.e. the concrete sensory data. 
Carnap’s conception of philosophy draws on many ideas from Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus. Philosophy is the logical analysis of language. For Carnap, the principles 
of logical analysis are expressible in terms of logical syntax. (For Wittgenstein, 
these principles are ultimately unnecessary, since they are shown in a logical nota-
tion of ideal scientific language.) A language for the describing of logical syntax is 
30 Ibid., p. 124.
31 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., §6.53.
32 Ibid., Preface.
33 Merrill Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986, 
pp. 51ff. maintain that the primary language of the Tractatus is phenomenological. The objects of 
the Tractatus are very close to Russell’s objects of acquaintance, i.e. to sense-data. See also 
Andreas Blank, “Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the Problem of a Phenomenological Language”, in: 
Philosophia, Vol. 29, No. 1–4, 2002, p. 327.
34 Arnošt Kolman, Kritický výklad symbolické metody moderní logiky, op. cit., p. 204.
35 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., §6.124.
36 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World. Trans. R.  George. Chicago: Open Court 
Classics 2003.
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a meta-language which refers to the object language. The basic principles of a meta- 
language must be based on another meta-meta-language, or there must be obvious 
logical axioms. Like Russell, Carnap is forced to accept that there are general 
 principles that cannot be derived from experience. This is approaching Hilbert’s 
meta- mathematics. It also may explain why Kolman attributes to Carnap an attempt 
“to create a universal mathematical philosophical theory of all being”.37
Curiously enough though, for Carnap logic laws were not the principle of all 
being. Logic, according to Carnap, is conventional. His view is expressed, for 
instance, in the following passage:
It is important to notice that the logical and mathematical objects are not actually objects in 
the sense of real objects (objects of the empirical sciences). Logic (including mathematics) 
consists solely of conventions concerning the use of symbols, and of tautologies on the basis 
of these conventions. Thus, the symbols of logic (and mathematics) do not designate 
objects, but merely serve as symbolic fixations of these conventions.38
Carnap also endorses Kolman’s three main features of logical positivism 
without explicitly slipping into logical or mathematical fetishism. If it were 
possible, this would pose a serious problem for Kolman’s main argument as 
exposed above. The language of logic (or of meta-language) is conventional. 
For Carnap (as well as for Wittgenstein), there are no logical or mathematical 
objects to which logical or mathematical concepts refer (cf. Wittgenstein’s fun-
damental idea that logical constants do not represent any objects or facts). 
Wittgenstein concludes that “The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding 
of the world, or rather they represent it.”39 How then is Carnap able to resist 
coming to this conclusion? Well, only by the construing of a hierarchy of meta-
languages. But as already said this hierarchy cannot run into infinity. Sooner or 
later, one will be forced to admit some principles or axioms that are not derived 
from any meta-language. They must be in a certain sense obvious. This is to say 
that the reason why these principles are “obvious” is inexpressible, but one part 
of their obviousness is that they can be applied (through the hierarchy of meta-
languages) to all facts. It is, however, not plausible to claim that these principles 
are conventional, which therefore means, they are arbitrary. Carnap is, in the 
end, forced to Wittgenstein’s conclusion and thus to the fetishization of logic 
and mathematics.
We can therefore conclude that Kolman’s understanding of logical positivism—
as he demarcated this view—is correct, even considering some inaccuracies and 
false attributions.
37 Arnošt Kolman, Kritický výklad symbolické metody moderní logiky, op. cit., p. 254.
38 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, op. cit., p. 178; Carnap’s italics.
39 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., §6.124.
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7.7  Arguments Against Fetishization
The above mentioned philosophers do something that has always been one of the 
main tasks of metaphysics: They are all looking for the essential features of reality 
by abstracting from accidental features. Why should Kolman, and hence Marxism, 
be bothered about this?
Lenin’s work Materialism and Empirio-criticism40 is a fundamental attack on 
Mach’s neutral monism from a Marxist standpoint. Lenin shows that although Mach 
and his successors were trying to be neutral as regards the decision between materi-
alism and idealism, nevertheless they lapse into Berkeleyan subjective idealism in 
yet another guise. Kolman applied Lenin’s arguments to Russell’s neutral monism. 
This idealism has socio-political origins, as we have seen in a much simpler form 
with Pythagoreism: “the socio-political sense of this fetishization of mathematics 
and of the entire neopositivism … is that this ‘reality’ that is neither material nor 
spiritual, allows the opportunity to take our ideas for being just as the ‘real’ essence 
as things and phenomena of the material world are, and thus ultimately justify ‘real’ 
politics … based on the misleading views on the possibility and necessity of recon-
ciliation with this nasty order of parasitism, violence and lies.”41 Mathematical 
fetishism arises from the mycelium of neutral monism, whose socio-political sense 
is that it allows for maintaining the status quo of social relations and conditions.
Is this a serious argument, or rather just a piece of communist propaganda? Is 
there any connection between the fetishization of logic or mathematics and conser-
vatism in social order? If there is any connection at all, it is not a priori but rather a 
posteriori. Hegelian and Marxist philosophy is not an inquiry into a priori laws or 
forms. Hegelian philosophy can understand social practices (“shapes of the spirit”) 
only in retrospect. If this understanding is correct, if the theory correctly interprets 
its object, then it can have a prospective effect.42 Kolman only suggests that it is 
plausible to see a connection between mathematical and logical fetishism and 
conservatism.
A priori laws are derived, by means of abstraction, from experience. Kant, for 
example, derived his list of categories from the forms of possible judgment. 
These forms of judgment are given to us in the experience of judging. Kant gives 
no argument that he had enlisted all the possible forms of judgment. There is no 
convincing argument that Kant’s list is exhaustive (and it is clear that by consid-
ering only the subject-predicate forms he must have missed some other forms). 
In a further step, we see that empirical evidence (the list) is fixed at some point 
and a priori laws are derived from it. These a priori laws may include also social 
laws. The connection to social conservatism lies in this fixing of the experience 
40 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism: Critical Comments on a Reactionary 
Philosophy, op. cit.
41 Arnošt Kolman, Kritický výklad symbolické metody moderní logiky, op. cit., p. 277.
42 See Shaun Gallagher, Hegel, History, and Interpretation. SUNY Press: Albany, New York 1997, 
p. 9.
7 Arnošt Kolman’s Critique of Mathematical Fetishism
144
used for the derivation of a priori laws. No further experience is conceived of, no 
experience that may possibly contradict the actual a priori law. Hence, it is plau-
sible to see a connection here between mathematical and logical fetishism and 
conservatism.43
Kolman’s second main argument is that the logical and mathematical fetishes are 
epistemologically deprived of any historical and dynamic dimension. This argu-
ment or rather objection goes back to Herder’s and Hegel’s critique of Kant’s aprior-
ism. Formal logic examines only the isolated and unchangeable forms of thoughts, 
“but they are not sufficient for an adequately truly scientific understanding of the 
world”.44 Logic and mathematics are historical sciences and their truths are histori-
cally contingent. Mathematical and logical fetishism overlooks this conditionality. 
Logical positivists may concede that there are different logics. Moreover, they may 
admit that one logical system evolved from a historically earlier logical system. 
They may admit as matter of fact that logic has history. But this development is 
something external and accidental to a particular logical system which cannot 
explain its essential characteristics as being necessarily evolved from previous 
systems.
The basic foundation of all epistemology is not logic or mathematics, but the 
praxis. If we did not admit the criterion of praxis for the sufficient criterion of 
knowledge, then we would not recognize the materiality of the world.45 Or, in 
Lenin’s words: “The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental 
in the theory of knowledge.”46
43 Curiously enough, there has been developed quite opposed arguments claiming that there is a 
substantial connection between logical positivism and Marxism or communism. Heidegger is the 
most striking case. He wrote in a reply to Carnap’s paper “Überwinding der Metaphysik durch 
logische Analyse der Sprache”: “It is also no accident that this kind of ‘philosophy’ stands in both 
internal and external connection with Russian communism.” His argument, for the internal related-
ness, is that in the mathematical philosophy, truth is diverted into a certainty, which leads to the 
profaning [Entgötterung] of the world. If we get over Heidegger’s too quickly equating Russian 
communism and Marxism in general, we see he is not the only one holding this view. The goal of 
Neurath’s scientific philosophy was social and political progress in broadly Marxist perspective. 
Also Carnap, at least partly, admitted this internal connection when he reported his “Marxist views 
on how metaphysics will be overcome through reformation [Umgestaltung] of the substructure.” 
(The quotations are taken from Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, and 
Heidegger. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2000, pp. 22, 21. See for more discussion therein.) 
It seems, thus, that logical positivism and Marxism are allies rather than enemies. All these facts 
pose serious problems for Kolman’s view.
44 Arnošt Kolman, Kritický výklad symbolické metody moderní logiky, op. cit., p. 211.
45 Arnošt Kolman, Logika, op. cit., p. 167.
46 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism, op. cit., p. 142.
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7.8  Kolman in Context
Although Arnošt Kolman’s critique of mathematical fetishism is unique in the 
Czech context, he was not the first one who criticized logical positivism. The aim of 
this final section of our paper is to place Koman’s thinking into a broader context of 
the Marxist critique of logical and mathematical methods in philosophy.
David Guest (1911–1938) was a British philosopher and communist activist who 
studied under Moore and Wittgenstein in Cambridge at the beginning of the 1930s. 
Then he visited Russia and published, in the Soviet journal Under the Banner of 
Marxism, a paper “The Machian Tendency in Modern British Philosophy” (in 
Russian).47 Under the Banner of Marxism was the most significant philosophical 
journal in the Soviet Union at that time attracting the most outstanding Soviet schol-
ars. Kolman was back then a member of the editorial board and one of the most 
frequent authors.48 Let us look closely at Guest’s arguments that must have inspired 
Kolman’s subsequent writings.
Guest aims in the paper to expose Machian tendencies, and primarily the neutral 
position between idealism and materialism, in Russell, Wittgenstein and Whitehead. 
The most elaborate part of the paper is devoted to Russell. Guest traces back 
Russell’s neutral monism through his writings from early on to his most recent book 
The Analysis of Matter where neutral monism is fully accepted. Guest identifies a 
methodological principle which leads to neutral monism in Russell’s Principle of 
Economy: “The supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing is this: Wherever pos-
sible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.”49,50 Hence, 
Guest argues, Russell’s scientific philosopher has to construct objects, space and 
time out of complexes of sense-data.51 Guest further focuses on Russell’s account of 
particulars. Material objects are given to us through sense-data. This means, how-
ever, that material objects are constructed out of sense-data. Applying the Principle 
of Economy shows that particulars, thus, must include sense-data or—as Russell 
calls them—appearances, but not material objects. Russell is forced to accept that 
there exist possible, i.e. non-actual appearances (or “sensibilia” as Russell also calls 
them). This possibility of non-actual appearances follows from the fact that appear-
ances are more basic than physical states made of material objects. Actual brains are 
physical states, hence “‘Appearances’ may perhaps exist without there being brains 
47 David Guest, “The Machian Tendency in Modern British Philosophy”, in: Carmel Haden Guest 
(Ed.), David Guest: A Scientist Fights for Freedom (1911–1938). A Memoir. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart 1939, pp. 219–249. First published in Russian in: Under the Banner of Marxism, No. 5, 
1934, pp. 31–45.
48 See the discussion of Kolman’s paper “Hegel and Mathematics” above.
49 Bertrand Russell, “The Relation of Sense-data to Physics”, in: Mysticism and Logic. London: 
George Allen & Unwin 1917, p. 115.
50 Carnap took this maxim as the epigraph of The logical Structure of the World (1928).
51 David Guest, “The Machian Tendency in Modern British Philosophy”, op. cit., p. 224.
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to perceive them.”52 Guest acknowledges that this argument is derived from Lenin’s 
critique of so-called “brainless philosophy”.53 Guest’s critique of Russell continues: 
Appearances exist in time. Russell admits that there are chains of appearances or 
sensibilia that can be attributed to one’s experience. Such chains are called “biogra-
phies”: “By this means, the history of the world is divided into a number of mutually 
exclusive biographies.”54 But, given that there can exist appearances without being 
actually realized in anybody’s brain, biographies consisting of such appearances are 
simply disembodied spirits.55
Guest further moves on to Russell’s Analysis of Matter (1927), where the prin-
ciple of economy is called “the principle of logical construction” and the neutral 
elements are called “events”. Events are, according to Russell, metaphysically 
primitive entities. But again, percepts (as Russell now calls his appearances or 
sensebilia) are events, but physical objects such as electrons, protons or points in 
space-time are not. Guest, thus, concludes that this is “the very same theory of dis-
embodies perceptions” that we met earlier.
Guest’s argument as to why Berkeleyan idealism in the guise of neutral monism 
has to be rejected is very sketchy. He says: “What is common to all these views is 
that they are all on the inclined plane slipping down to mysticism and religion.”56 
The same is true of Kolman’s arguments in this respect as well. Guest’s paper con-
tinues in the same vein with a critique of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Guest takes the 
Tractatus as a kind of confirmation of the intricate connection of logical positivism 
and religion or, better to say, mysticism:
We have here a masterly example of an undialectical philosophy, anti-historical and meta-
physical to an extreme. … And here too we can learn how an attitude of extreme empiricism 
… when pushed to its logical conclusion leads to utter mysticism.57,58
In conclusion, Guest’s paper—strong in its application of Lenin’s critique of 
Machian philosophy onto Russell’s neutral monism—must have been an inspiration 
for Kolman’s more elaborate critique of logical positivism.
Guest’s critique might have been influenced by Wittgenstein himself who, in his 
lectures at the beginning of the 1930s, criticized Russell’s and his own earlier 
account of logic.59 Although Wittgenstein did not explicitly address neutral monism 
52 Ibid., p. 226.
53 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism, op. cit., p. 49.
54 Bertrand Russell, “The Relation of Sense-data to Physics”, op. cit., p. 123.
55 David Guest, “The Machian Tendency in Modern British Philosophy”, op. cit., p. 227.
56 Ibid., p. 232.
57 Ibid., p. 238.
58 It is a historical irony that some contemporary interpretations take the Tractatus to be dialectical, 
historical and anti-metaphysical. See, e.g., Mathew Ostrow, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Dialectical 
Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002 and Ben Ware, Dialectic of the 
Ladder. Wittgenstein, the ‘Tractatus’ and Modernism. London: Bloomsbury 2015.
59 Our claim is that there is a significant substantial affinity between Kolman’s notion of mathemat-
ical fetishism and Wittgenstein’s notion of sublimation of logic. Moreover, there might have been 
a two-way influence. There are some hints at least. Wittgenstein had visited Russia in 1935. His 
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(or we do not possess any record of it at least), the idea behind was clear: Logic is 
nothing sublime. Wittgenstein speaks later in the Philosophical Investigations about 
“the tendency to sublimate the logic of our language”.60 The sublimation of logic 
means to bestow upon it a universal significance. More specifically:
For logical investigation explores the essence of all things. It seeks to see to the foundation 
of things, and shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually happen in this or that way. 
— It arises neither from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need to grasp causal 
connections, but from an urge to understand the foundations, or essence, of everything 
empirical.61
In other words, logic does not express the essence of all things. This is, the same 
point that is pressed by Kolman, i.e., logic must not be fetishized. Not logic, but 
practice lies at the bottom of our knowledge. If Wittgenstein says that we should 
look at the use of our language, he comes very close to Marx’ and Lenin’s stand-
point of practice. This observation—this primacy of practice in Marx as well as in 
Wittgenstein—has not escaped the attention of some commentators. So David 
Andrews proposes that “commodity fetishism should be understood as the form of 
life, the activity of the participants of the system of commodity production, which 
corresponds to what I have called the value language-game.”62 Andrews argues that 
commodity fetishism arises because people see commodities as objectified products 
of labour, while in fact “commodities do not possess any other objective character”.63 
Commodity fetishism is not only an illusion, “it is a feature of how things actually 
are in commodity production. Commodity fetishism is an activity in which people 
engage, a form of life.”64
Translating Marx’s idea into the language of the later Wittgenstein may make 
Marx’s point about commodity fetishism more comprehensible for us. Now, with 
the help of Kolman, this point can be extended onto mathematical and logical fetish-
ism. Fetishism in this respect is something natural in our philosophical praxis; it is 
the tendency to see mathematics or logic as something sublime, as something behind 
all facts, as something essential to them, as something a priori. It is (part of) the 
tendency to find the objective order out of chaos. Logical and mathematical proper-
ties and relations are, at the same time, not pure illusions. They have various roles 
main contact and host there was Sofya Yanovskaya, Kolman’s long-time collaborator, who coau-
thored Kolman’s early paper ‘Hegel and Mathematics’ (see footnote 5). Wittgenstein was familiar 
with the main tenets of dialectical materialism and had acquaintance with parts of Marx’s Capital. 
(See John Moran, “Wittgenstein and Russia”, in: New Left Review, No. 73, 1972, pp. 85–96.)
60 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. G.  E. M.  Anscombe and R.  Rhees (eds), 
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, revised by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim 
Schulte, revised fourth edition. London: Blackwell 2009, §38.
61 Ibid., §89.
62 David Andrews, “Commodity Fetishism as a Form of Life”, in: Gavin Kitching and Nigel 
Pleasants (eds.), Marx and Wittgenstein. Knowledge, Morality and Politics. London: Routledge 
2002, p. 85.
63 Ibid., p. 88.
64 Ibid., p. 89.
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in our thinking or more specifically in our philosophical praxis, e.g. making our 
ideas clear, distinguishing between valid and invalid judgements, or making count-
ing easier etc. But, if we, in our philosophical praxis, take mathematical or logical 
properties as expressing the objective character of things, they acquire a double 
fantastic existence—they become fetishes. These fetishes as autonomous existences 
then strike back, they put constraints on things and facts (e.g. in sayings like “logics 
does not allow this or that”). This is a kind of conservativism that has social impacts, 
and this is something Kolman wanted to overcome or at least to curb. In order to get 
rid of logical fetishes, it is not simply enough to recognize their illusory character. 
We must change our whole philosophical praxis. Philosophy, as Marx had put for-
ward, has to become social criticism.
7.9  Appendix: Mathematical Fetishism Today
The focus of this paper is predominantly historical. But in this appendix, we would 
like to apply Kolman’s arguments against mathematical fetishism onto its contem-
porary form which has received a lot attention nowadays. Kolman defines mathe-
matical fetishism as the view that mathematical principles are the principles of all 
being, that is to say that mathematics has an ontological relevance. Aspects of this 
view are to be found in the time of Pythagoreanism and later in logical positivism in 
the first half of the twentieth century.65 But mathematical fetishism is not something 
that belongs only to the past. One of the most prominent philosophers today, Alain 
Badiou, claims that “ontology, the science of being qua being, is nothing other than 
mathematics itself.”66 In his main work Being and Event, the mathematical founda-
tion of ontology is made up by (classical) set theory where “every ‘object’ is reduc-
ible to a pure multiplicity”.67 Every situation (which is in Badiou’s terminology any 
“presented multiplicity”) is from the ontological point of view a set. Furthermore, 
“There is nothing apart from situations.”68 Hence, sets are everything that there is. 
Badiou also presents a mathematical theory of all being—which is something that 
Kolman (falsely) ascribed to Carnap.
Only Badiou’s main thesis is sketched here (other important tenets of his theory 
will be presented below), but we can nevertheless ask whether it is a case of math-
ematical fetishism. And indeed, in their highly critical review of Being and Event, 
Ricardo L. Nirenberg and David Nirenberg objected to Badiou that set-theoretical 
objects are unchangeable: “An ontology that takes ZF set theory as its basis must 
65 This remark does not mean that mathematical fetishism is to be found only in Pythagoreanism 
and logical positivism. One could also mention Galileo at least.
66 Alain Badiou, Being and Event. Trans. by Oliver Feltham. London: Continuum 2005, p.xiii.
67 Ibid., p. 14. In Logic of Worlds: Being and Event II. London: Continuum, 2009, Badiou provides 
a theory of appearance (which he calls phenomenology) based on category theory. For the sake of 
simplicity, we restrict the present discussion to Badiou’s treatment of set theory.
68 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, op. cit., p. 25.
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deny reality to that which is affected; it must take math as the only real knowledge 
and mathematical objects as the only real beings, as Badiou himself repeatedly 
asserts. On these grounds alone we feel justified in calling Badiou more of a 
Pythagorean than a Platonist.”69 What is the argument here at stake? The Nirenbergs 
object that Badiou’s ontology is, in the end, static, incapable of any change. This 
argument resembles Kolman’s first argument above. But Badiou’s consequences for 
social philosophy are anything but conservative. On the contrary, his ontology is 
capable of accounting for radical novelty and change in the social order, i.e. 
revolution.
Novelty and change enter Badiou’s ontology through his concept of “generic 
extension”. Without going into complex technical details, a generic extension is 
when it is “added to the situation without being able to be directly deduced from it,” 
it also “unveils unknown possibilities of the primitive situation”.70 This set- 
theoretical formalism allows, thus, the extension of a set in such a way that in this 
new set there is a discernible property that was indiscernible by any predicate in the 
initial set. Such an extension remains random from the perspective of the initial set; 
it depends only on a generic procedure. By analogy with his set-theoretical founda-
tions, Badiou distinguishes four generic procedures: love, art, science, and politics. 
“What happens in art, in science, in true (rare) politics, and in love (if it exists), is 
the coming to light of an indiscernible of the times, which, as such, is neither a 
known or recognized multiple, nor an ineffable singularity”.71 Love, art, science, 
and politics are generic procedures, because they “generate—infinitely—truths con-
cerning situations”72 and other practices do not.
Badiou’s set-theoretical foundation of ontology, thus, allows for radical change 
(personal or political freedom), that is it allows for the emerging of a situation that 
is radically different from the initial situation. Kolman’s charge of political conser-
vativism therefore does not apply here, for Badiou’s mathematical ontology is much 
more thought-out than Kolman ever imagined. Badiou’s ontology, thus, escapes 
from Kolman’s first argument against mathematical fetishism.73 But what about his 
second argument, i.e., that mathematical fetishes are deprived of any historical per-
spective? Let us put the problem this way: What is it that makes the connection 
between mathematical formalism (which has according to Badiou ontological pri-
mordiality) and (individual or social) praxis? Or why are there exactly these four 
69 Ricardo L. Nirenberg and David Nirenberg, “Badiou’s Number: A Critique of Mathematics as 
Ontology”, in: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 606–7. The authors also men-
tion Kolman and his role in the Luzin affair.
70 Alain Badiou, “To Preface the Response to the ‘Criticisms’ of Ricardo Nirenberg and David 
Nirenberg”, in: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2012, p. 363.
71 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, op. cit., p. 17.
72 Ibid., p. 340.
73 On the other hand, Badiou thinks, in agreement with Kolman, that analytic philosophy is inher-
ently non-dialectical and it is internally related to conservativism. (Cf. Alain Badiou, “What is 
Philosophy?”. In: European Graduate School Video Lectures, YouTube, 2 May 2011. Retrieved 
from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6FQkTajudY, 27 July 2015.)
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generic procedures? Do really only love, art, science, and politics generate new 
knowledge and the other practices do not? A Marxist, for example, would opt for 
political economy as the only generic procedure?74 Does it not hold that a new piece 
of knowledge may emerge in every kind of practice? And finally, can we answer 
these questions once and for all?75 Our point is that no matter how we answer these 
questions, such answers are not deducible from the mathematical framework that 
Badiou employs. Naming the four generic procedures is, at best, an analogy to the 
set-theoretical concept of genericity. No mathematical formalism speaks for itself 
or, it is better to say, that every (piece of) mathematical formalism (i.e., every formal 
language) must be applied onto reality if it should deliver any substantial knowledge 
about reality. Such an application involves a non-trivial projection.76 A projection is 
a way of reading off the formal language; it is an interpretation of this language. But 
then a projection is the praxis of interpreting the language. The upshot of this is that 
mathematics (which is ontology) depends on the praxis which is socially and his-
torically determined.
To conclude, Badiou with his ingenious employment of mathematical formalism 
is able to escape from Kolman’s charge of political conservativism, but not from 
Kolman’s second argument against mathematical fetishism (that it is deprived of 
any historical dimension) which applies here too.
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